# Nature of language

Wilhelm von Humboldt · developing English translation

English-reading review completed; German fidelity remains provisional.

Edition snapshot: 3e1f30ab374637421861f911f8d42c207b01908b

Source: GS V, Leitzmann 1906. https://github.com/BrettRey/humboldt-grundzuege-translation

## 1. Presentation of the American languages in the manner and according to the procedure of their operation.

**16** The same mental process undeniably recurs in every language; from language to language, powers, means and results are as alike and as unlike one another as human bodily and mental dispositions for language permit diversity within the limits set by nature. When attempting to describe individual languages, we must now begin with the general type of this process and return to it, since otherwise we would entirely lack the necessary point of comparison. The generality of this type consists in everything that can be said of it being conditioned solely by the pure concept of language, while all other circumstances are disregarded: circumstances that arise from the remaining human dispositions and the conditions acting upon them, and that individualize the general type in reality.

**17** What has so far been developed in this sense under the name of general grammar falls far short of exhausting the concept, and stops at only a small part of it. Unfortunately, we do not yet know whether this discipline had already made progress among the Indian grammarians; the Greek grammarians, however, had brought certain aspects of it to a perfection that left little to add. It is actually concerned only with the logical analysis of discourse and the examination of the word forms needed to connect thoughts within it: thus, in the first instance, with a product of language, and consequently with only a part of language.[^nature-indian-grammar] Here and there, the concept of general grammar has indeed been given a wider scope; but nowhere, so far as I know, has anyone attempted what is required here: an analysis of the procedure of language in its combined operation as a whole. Since general grammar is also chiefly concerned with examining grammatical forms individually as the components of discourse, it falls largely within the following section, according to the quite different division of linguistic analysis attempted here. It can therefore in no way relieve us of the task of establishing anew, through the development of our own ideas, the general principles needed to compare particulars, however much better it would be, when describing a class of particular languages, to refer to a general theoretical system of language already constructed and tested elsewhere.

**18** Our first task must therefore be to sketch the general type of language, at least in outline, and then to examine what division of all the material to be treated in this chapter might follow from it.

## A. Outlines of the general type of language.

## a. The nature of language in general.

**19** The mental process of language is taken here in its widest scope, considering language not only in relation to discourse and its stock of word elements, but also in relation to its influence on the capacity for thought and feeling. We consider the whole course by which language, proceeding from the mind, acts back upon the mind: in the individual, in the generation living at any given time, and in the nation across several generations.

**20** For it has already been demonstrated elsewhere, and may surely be accepted as undisputed, that language does not merely designate thought formed independently of it, but is itself the formative organ of thought. Intellectual activity, wholly mental, wholly inward, and passing, in a sense, without a trace, becomes external and perceptible to the senses through sound in discourse, and receives a lasting body through writing. What is produced in this way is everything spoken and recorded; language, however, is the totality of the sounds that the particular intellectual activity to which it belongs can produce by this means, together with their possible combinations and transformations according to laws that arise, in turn, from the nature of intellectual activity and its corresponding system of sounds. Intellectual activity and language are therefore one and inseparable; we cannot even regard the former simply as what produces and the latter as what is produced. For although what is spoken on any occasion is certainly a product of the mind, it belongs to a language already in existence, and is therefore determined not only by the mind's activity but also by the sounds and laws of that language; and, immediately passing back into language as a whole, it in turn acts back upon the mind, determining it. Intellectual activity is bound by the necessity of entering into a connection with sound; otherwise thinking cannot attain distinctness, nor can a representation become a concept. It produces sound by a free decision and shapes it through its power, for sound becomes articulated sound through being permeated by intellectual activity; and (if it were possible to conceive a beginning of all language) it establishes a domain of such sounds that independently acts back upon the activity, determining and limiting it.[^nature-establishment]

**21** What thinking requires in language is not, strictly speaking, what is actually audible to the ear; or, to put it differently, if articulated sound is divided into articulation and noise, thinking requires only the former, not the latter.[^nature-noise] Articulation rests on the mind's power over the organs of speech, compelling them to treat sound in a way that corresponds to the form of the mind's own operation. What brings this form and articulation together, as though in a connecting medium, is that both divide their domains into elementary parts whose combination invariably produces wholes that carry within themselves the striving to become parts of new wholes. Besides this power, however, the mind also contains an urge to make such use of the organs of speech, an urge communicated to those organs themselves; and the production of language rests on this power and this urge even independently of noise audible to the ear. The example of deaf-mutes teaches us that language is indeed wholly inward and remains possible even without the production or perception of sound.[^nature-deaf-language] Every avenue of access to them through the ear is closed, yet they learn to understand what is spoken from the movements of the speaker's organs of speech and from writing; they themselves speak when the position and movement of their organs of speech are guided. This can happen only through the faculty of articulation that they too possess: through the connection between their thinking and their organs of speech, they learn to guess, in another person, one member of this connection—the person's thinking—from the other, the movement of that person's organs of speech. The sound we hear reveals itself to them through the position and movement of the organs; they perceive its articulation without its noise. There may also be something sensory in them corresponding to this noise, perhaps something their imagination supplies in place of what is missing, something of which we have no conception; but in any event, a remarkable division of articulated sound takes place in them. They really do understand language, since they learn to read and write alphabetically and even to speak themselves, rather than merely understanding thought through signs or pictures. They learn this not merely because they possess reason like other human beings, but specifically because they also possess a capacity for language: an accord between their thinking and their organs of speech, and an urge to make the two act together, both essentially grounded in their human nature, though it is mutilated in one respect.

**22** Articulation—whose concept I take here only in terms of its effect, as the shaping of sound that makes it a bearer of thoughts—has nevertheless been described above only in its logical, or at least only in its intellectual, nature. In its essential nature, however, it depends precisely on sound as noise, or rather on the vibration of the air through which the organs of speech act at a distance. It can therefore never be applied directly to any sense other than hearing; however one attempted this, one would always produce only signs of sounds, not directly signs of words divisible into elementary parts.[^nature-articulation-senses] This is because precisely the vibration of the air produced by organs determined by thought, and audible to another person's ear, is inseparably connected with human nature and necessary to its development.

**23** Three things are involved here: thought's urge towards utterance, sensation's need for the animal cry, and the necessity of social interaction for the development of thought. Each of these leads independently to the production of sound, and language unites them all in articulated sound.

**24** Thinking is a mental act, but through its need for language it becomes an impulse towards a bodily act. It is a progressive unfolding, a purely inward movement in which nothing lasting, steady or at rest can be assumed, and at the same time a longing to pass from darkness into light, from limitation into infinity. In the human being, whose twofold nature is fused into one, this striving also turns outwards. Through the mediation of the organs of speech, it finds in air—the finest and most easily moved of all the elements, whose apparent incorporeality corresponds to the mind even at the sensory level—a material wonderfully suited to it: a material in which, given the upright human posture, discourse flows freely and calmly from lips to ear, which carries to us the light of the heavenly bodies, and which extends into infinity without visible bounds.[^nature-starlight]

**25** As mental striving thus breaks its way through the lips, its product returns to one's own ear; the subjective inner act is received again as an external object. Language thereby shares and advances the innermost nature of thinking: the continual passage of subject and object into one another. For no kind of representation can be regarded as the mere contemplation of an object already present. The activity of the senses must unite synthetically with the mind's inner act; the representation breaks free from this union, becomes an object confronting the subjective power, and, perceived anew as such, returns into that power. Thus, quite apart from communication between human beings, speaking is a necessary condition of the individual's thinking in secluded solitude. In its actual manifestation, however, language develops only socially. For a human being understands himself only by having tried and tested the intelligibility of his words on others.

**26** When unarticulated sound takes the place of language, as it always does in animals and sometimes in human beings, it is either wrung out by distress, as with unpleasant sensations, or prompted by an intention, as when it entices, warns or calls for help; or else it flows, without distress or intention, from the joyful feeling of existence, from delight in the ringing out of sounds. This last is the poetic element, a spark beginning to glow in animal dullness. These different kinds of sounds are distributed very unevenly among the more or less mute or richly voiced kinds of animals, and the higher and more joyful kind has fallen to comparatively few. Discovering the source of this difference would also be instructive for language, but may be impossible. The fact that birds alone possess song might perhaps be explained by their living more freely than all other animals in the element of sound, and in its purer regions, were it not that so many kinds of birds, like the animals that walk upon the earth, are confined to a few monotonous sounds.[^nature-animal-song]

**27** The same impelling causes pass into language: distress, intention and delight in discourse. But in language the last also, and chiefly, concerns thought, and this adds a fourth cause: the need to communicate and develop ideas and feelings through conversation. It is surely among the most erroneous claims to attribute the emergence of languages principally to the need for mutual assistance. Human beings in the state of nature are not so needy, and unarticulated sounds would have sufficed for that purpose, as we see in animals. Language is wholly human, even in its beginnings. Even the languages of the so-called savages[^nature-savages], and precisely those languages, possess an abundance and variety of expressions that everywhere exceed need; and there is probably no wandering family in any wilderness that does not have its songs, for the human being, considered as an animal species, is essentially a singing creature, only one that joins ideas to its tones. The far more essential cause of the emergence of language is delight in speaking, and hence the degree to which a people is taciturn or talkative has such an important influence on the formation of languages.

**28** Even in their noblest strivings, human beings must always be considered in their whole nature, one side of which they share with animality; hence in language too we must not overlook the mere sounding through which, as it were, animal sound passes into articulated sound. The first thing to observe here is the relation of this sounding to the designation of ideas. It may be compared with colouring in painting. Languages are sometimes richer in it, sometimes poorer, sometimes freer of resounding noise, sometimes more overloaded with it. It also happens, however, that languages, either generally or at certain stages of development, mix into actual language a greater or lesser amount of ringing out devoid of ideas, using syllables and even words without any definite effect on the sense, almost solely to fill out the sound. A certain feeling may admittedly attach to all expressions of this kind, but that is also possible with unarticulated sound. Through the cultivation of language, these mere filler words either disappear or, in the more favourable case, become, through more artful elaboration, signs of fine nuances of ideas or of their connections.

**29** Finally, the true individuality of each language lies solely in the nature of sound as such. Whatever one may do or attempt in describing its distinctive features, one only determines more and more closely the class to which it belongs; only the language itself, sounding before the ear, can express itself as this language and no other. Although the alphabet of all humanity is enclosed within certain limits that are not even very wide, every people with a language of its own nevertheless also has its own sound system: in the exclusion of certain sounds, the preference for others, the assignment of different sounds to designate different concepts, the treatment of sounds in their combinations, and so forth. This may be compared with the different cries and vocal modes of the kinds of animals. Even though progressive development brings much to a close, there is nevertheless something fixed in this, something characteristic of a stock, deeply grounded in modifications of the organs of speech and in the feeling for sound.[^nature-abschliesst] It distinguishes stocks even more than languages, since within the same language individual stocks have sounds that differ entirely from those of all the others, as the Florentines, for example, have their breathy guttural sound. But apart from such particulars, which seem contingent for language itself, the sound system has the most significant influence on the most essential parts of every language; it is the first thing in which one must gain a thoroughly firm footing. Admittedly, this leads into a laborious investigation of elements, often descending into minutiae; yet the total impression of languages rests entirely on particulars that are minute in themselves, and nothing is so incompatible with studying languages as wanting to seek in them only what is great, intellectual and predominant. Close attention to every grammatical subtlety, and the splitting of words into their elements, are absolutely necessary if we are not to expose all our judgements about structure, and even about descent, to error.

**30** The most important reason why language needs to act outwards through sound is sociability, towards which human beings are unconditionally directed by their nature. Sociability contains two things, though closely joined in a third and higher one: first, that all human powers develop fully only in society; and second, that there is something common to the entire human race, of which each individual possesses a particular determination carrying within it the desire for completion through the others. Both are especially important precisely in the case of language. For the greater and more animated the combined social action upon language, the more it gains, other things being equal; and the possibility of all understanding rests on the common element just mentioned.

**31** Sociability, too, cannot be derived from mere need without taking a one-sided view. It does not rest on need even in animals. Hardly any animal is so sufficient to itself in its strength as the elephant, which nevertheless lives predominantly in herds. Even in animals, therefore, the inclination towards sociability, greater in some kinds and lesser in others, arises from causes lying much deeper in their nature. Yet it is impossible for us to fathom these causes, because we can form no conception of the animals' nevertheless undeniable ability to perceive, to feel and to connect perceptions. In human beings, however, thinking is essentially bound to social existence; quite apart from all bodily relations and relations of feeling, a human being needs a 'you' corresponding to the 'I' merely in order to think. A concept attains its definiteness and clarity only by being reflected back from another power of thought. The concept is produced by breaking free from the moving mass of the activity of representing and forming itself into an object confronting the subject. It is not enough, however, for this division to occur within the subject alone; objectivity is completed only when the person forming representations actually beholds the thought outside himself, which is possible only in another being who, like himself, forms representations and thinks. But language is the only mediator between one power of thought and another, and so here too its necessity for the completion of thought emerges. There is also an unalterable dualism in language itself, and all speaking rests on address and reply. The word is not a thing; rather, in relation to things, it is something subjective. Yet in the thinker's mind it is to be an object, produced by that mind and acting back upon it. To distinguish itself from a merely apparent object, a dream image, it must acquire reality in someone who hears and replies. The pronoun expresses this original type of all languages by distinguishing the second person from the third. 'I' and 'he' are really different objects, and between them everything is, strictly speaking, exhausted, for in other words they mean 'I' and 'not-I'. 'You', however, is a 'he' set opposite the 'I'. Whereas 'I' and 'he' rest on inner and outer perception, 'you' contains spontaneity of choice. It too is a 'not-I', but not, like 'he', in the sphere of all beings; it belongs to another sphere, that of action shared through influence. As a result, 'he' itself now contains, besides the 'not-I', a 'not-you' as well, and stands opposed not merely to one of them but to both. The fact that the same pronominal form runs through all languages shows that, according to the feeling of all peoples, speaking essentially presupposes that the speaker distinguishes, opposite himself, one addressee from everyone else. Several American languages even show particular care in singling out the second person by using different forms in the first person plural as well to indicate whether the addressee is included or excluded.[^nature-inclusive-we]

**32** What thus emerges when we try to analyse the simple act of thinking recurs incessantly in human mental life; social communication provides human beings with conviction and stimulation. The power of thought needs something like itself and yet separate from it. What is like it kindles it; what is separate from it gives it a touchstone for the reality of its inner productions. For human beings, in their changeable limitation, can regard truth, as that which is fixed without bounds, only as lying outside themselves; their entire mental striving is a struggle towards it, and the most powerful means of approaching it and measuring their distance from it is social union. Language is thus a necessary requirement both for the initial production of thought and for the progressive development of the mind.

**33** Mental communication, in passing from one person to another, presupposes in the latter something common to both. We understand a word we hear only because we could have said it ourselves. Nothing can be present in the soul except through its own activity, and understanding, just as much as speaking, is itself a stimulation of the power of language: in its inward receptivity in the former case, as in its outward activity in the latter. Hence it is also so natural for a person immediately to say again what has just been understood. Language therefore lies within every human being in its full extent; but this means only that everyone possesses a striving, regulated through the impulse and limitation supplied by a power modified in a particular way, gradually to produce the whole language, or to understand it when produced, as external or internal occasions call for it. This power, like every power, is naturally an individual one, but it is individualized according to all those generic concepts by virtue of which each genus can be taken as an individual in relation to a higher, more general genus. It is thus the general power of language, determined by the ethnic stock, the nation and the dialect; then, with its sound signs established, determined in its manner of use by all the inner qualities and external contingencies that act so powerfully on the inner life that their effect becomes perceptible in language; and finally determined by the individuality that can no longer be brought under any more general category. Each of these levels, ascending to the most general, forms a linguistic sphere determined by what is common to everything included within it and by what differs from everything outside it. Every general investigation of language must therefore, for each of the various points under consideration—for example, the alphabet—seek out the limits of human language in general, distinguish within this broad domain the smaller domains of particular classes of languages, each in turn contained within another, and everywhere examine whether these fulfil the concept from which the division proceeds, and thus form in their historical existence a whole given by the idea.

**34** Every multiplicity of things alike in kind brings this task with it, especially in investigations such as those concerning language, which are undertaken not merely to gain and present historical knowledge, but teleologically, to act back upon language and human beings in a formative way. The general interconnectedness of languages is indeed explained by the similarity in kind of human nature, in which similar powers operate according to the same laws. But a deeper investigation and fuller appreciation of language seem to me to lead much further, to a point towards which I have so far sought to prepare the way only through less demanding reflections, and at which no further explanation is possible; just as, indeed, no metaphysical investigation—that is, one grounded in an inquiry into being in itself—can lead further than the endpoint of what is to be explained. To me, then—for I prefer to express this in the tone of inner conviction rather than with the assurance of a general assertion—it seems that the essence of language is misconceived, the mental process of its emergence only apparently explained—not just its emergence as such, but also its emergence in each act of speaking and understanding—and its powerful influence on the inner life wrongly assessed, if humanity is regarded as countless natures belonging to the same species, rather than as one nature divided into countless individuals. This latter view is also reached in contexts quite different from language, and from entirely different starting points.[^nature-origin-parenthesis] The difference between these two opposed assertions is evident: according to the latter, humanity's inner kinship rests on the unity of its essence; according to the former, it rests only on the unity of the idea that comprehends humanity, whether in contemplation or in creation.

**35** The secret of human individuality, which may also be regarded as the secret of human existence, lies enclosed in the nature of this kinship. This is the point at which a difference might especially be expected in a state following the earthly one, a difference that, if consciousness connected the two states, would also bring about a thorough transformation of all previous views. This secret cannot be explained or fathomed; but to explain appearances correctly and give direction to intellectual striving, we must take care not to misconceive the true nature of that kinship of human individuality, not to derive it solely from logical and discursive concepts, but rather to grasp it from the depths of inner feeling and through reflection that pursues the investigation to its furthest limits. It is therefore already a gain to leave standing, even as no more than an intuited possibility, the view indicated above as correct, and so avoid shutting oneself within the opposite view.

**36** What speaks most convincingly against this opposite view for me is what was said above: that understanding too rests entirely on inward activity of one's own, and that speaking with one another is only a mutual awakening of the power of language present in the listener. Grasping words is something entirely different from understanding unarticulated sounds, and encompasses far more than the mere reciprocal evocation of the sound and the object indicated. A word can certainly also be taken as an indivisible whole, just as in writing one may recognize the sense of a group of words without yet being sure of its alphabetic composition; and it might be that the child's soul proceeds in this way at the earliest beginnings of understanding. But as soon as not merely the animal faculty of sensation but the human power of language is activated—and there may well be no moment even in the child when this does not occur, however faintly—the word is also perceived as articulated. What articulation adds to the mere evocation of the word's meaning—which it naturally also accomplishes more perfectly—is that it presents the word immediately, through its form, as part of an infinite whole, a language. For through articulation, even individual words offer the possibility of forming from their elements a number of other words that truly extends to infinity, according to determining feelings and rules, and thereby establishing among all words a kinship corresponding to the kinship of concepts. The soul would have no inkling of this artfully constructed mechanism, and would understand articulation no more than a blind person understands colour, if it did not possess a power to turn that possibility into reality. Children's learning to speak is not a matter of words being meted out, deposited in memory and babbled back with the lips, but a growth of the capacity for language through age and practice. What is heard does more than merely communicate itself: it prepares the soul to understand more readily what has not yet been heard; it clarifies what was heard long ago but was then only half understood or not understood at all, as its similarity in kind to what has just been heard suddenly becomes evident to a power that has since grown sharper; and it sharpens the urge and the ability to draw ever more of what is heard, ever more quickly, into understanding, letting ever less of it rush past as mere sound. Progress therefore does not occur at an even rate that increases only through greater exercise of memory, as it might in learning vocabulary, but at a rate that continually accelerates itself, since the enhancement of the power and the acquisition of material mutually strengthen and extend one another. That children undergo a development of the power of language rather than a mechanical learning of language is also demonstrated by the fact that all human powers are assigned a certain time of life for their development, and that under the most varied circumstances all children speak and understand at approximately the same age, varying only within a short span.[^nature-development] But how could the listener, merely through the growth of his developing power, gain such strength in mastering what is spoken, unless the same essence existed in speaker and listener, divided only into individuals suited to one another, so that a sign as delicate as articulated sound, yet drawn precisely from the deepest and fullest nature of that essence, suffices as a mediator to activate both in corresponding ways?

**37** If this is correct, it also becomes clear how the separation and mixture of nations become the cause of differences between their languages. For the further human beings diverge through these processes, the more the separation of individuality stands opposed to the unity of essence; although the unity of human nature in general is also demonstrated by the fact that children of any people, taken from their mother's lap and placed among any foreign people, develop their capacity for language in that people's language. This phenomenon can admittedly also be cited in support of precisely the opposite view: that speaking is merely a reproduction of what has been heard and depends on social contact, irrespective of unity or difference of essence. But however much must be attributed to the power—indeed, the predominant power—of the surrounding sounds, it would be arbitrary to deny the influence of descent, which is merely suppressed in these exceptional cases. Descent already exerts an undeniable influence on the vocal organs, which must be individually modified, naturally in accordance with the language of the fathers, and which now, in appropriation and resistance, mingle this modification with every influence exerted upon them. Nothing in a human being stands so isolated, however, and the intellectual capacity for language certainly also possesses a similar disposition characteristic of a stock. The fact that the language of one's homeland has far greater force and intimacy for educated and uneducated alike than a foreign language; that after a long deprivation it greets the ear with a kind of sudden enchantment, and touches it with longing when one is far away; and that this rests not at all on its mental content, the thought or feeling expressed, but precisely on what is inexplicable and most individual, its sound—this too might well speak for that real unity of essence. It is as though, in the native sound, one heard a part of oneself coming from the other person. If sufficient attention is paid to phenomena of this kind, individuals can also be identified in the finest and most intellectual use of language, in the literature of nations, who were estranged from childhood from their own language, which they never learned, yet always mixed something into their use of the language they acquired which showed that they had originally been destined for another language, but that this destiny had been accidentally altered, contrary to the nature of their being.[^nature-descent]

**38** Nevertheless, distinctive dialects also arise without any influence of descent, merely through social contact and a shared life. This occurs especially among particular classes of a people within the sphere of actual national languages; the distinctive dialects of women, so frequent particularly in the American languages, and those of the different social ranks in Malay, are of this kind. Common descent may also be added, however, as in the language of the Incas, which was at once a family language and a language of social rank.[^nature-inca] In all these cases, as in the formation of language generally, the principle is community that separates itself, whether accidentally or intentionally.

**39** In presenting language above as an organ of thought, we considered articulated sound, which constitutes its essence, in its twofold nature: as articulation (21) and as sound (22–38). If we now turn to what is produced through speaking, or rather through thinking in language, we find here too that the view that language merely designates perceived objects, whose totality we call the world, falls far short of exhausting its deep and full content. Just as no concept is possible without language, neither can any object exist for the soul without it, since every external object acquires reality for the soul only through the concept. The entire manner of the subjective perception of objects necessarily passes into the formation and use of language. For the word arises from this perception and is an imprint not of the object in itself, but of the image that the object produces in the soul. Since subjectivity is inevitably mingled with all objective perception, each human individuality can be regarded, even independently of language, as a distinctive standpoint for a view of the world. It becomes such a standpoint still more through language, since the word in turn makes itself an object confronting the soul and adds a new distinctive character that separates itself from the subject. The concept now therefore contains three things: the impression of the external object, the manner in which the subject receives it, and the effect of the word as a speech sound. An analogy running throughout the same language necessarily governs this last effect; and since a subjectivity alike in kind also acts upon language within the same nation, each language contains a distinctive view of the world. This expression in no way exceeds the measure of plain truth. For the connection among all the parts of language, and between the whole language and the nation, is so close that once this interaction establishes a definite direction, a distinctive character extending throughout must necessarily result. Language is a view of the world not merely because, since every concept is to be graspable through it, it must equal the world in extent, but also because only the transformation it performs upon objects enables the mind to discern the interconnectedness inseparable from the concept of the world. Human beings also live principally with objects as language presents those objects to them—and, since their feeling and action depend on their representations, indeed exclusively in this way. In the very act by which human beings spin language out of themselves, they spin themselves into it; and every language draws around the nation to which it belongs a circle that can be left only insofar as one simultaneously passes into the circle of another language. Learning a foreign language, when put to the right use, is therefore the acquisition of a new standpoint within one's previous view of the world, since every language contains the entire fabric of the concepts and manner of representation of a part of humanity.

**40** So far I have discussed speaking more than language, chiefly describing the production and understanding of discourse and the influence it exerts upon the soul. But from speaking there arises language—a stock of words and a system of rules—which, winding its way through the succession of millennia, grows into a power in some sense independent of the speaker of the moment, the generation of the moment, the nation, and ultimately even humanity itself. We have noted above that thought taken up into language becomes an object for the soul, exerting an effect upon it that comes to it, in this respect, as something foreign. But we have chiefly considered the object as arising from the subject, and the effect as proceeding from that upon which it acts back. Now the opposite view comes into play, according to which language really is a foreign object, and its effect really does proceed from something other than that upon which it acts. For language must necessarily belong to two people (31), and in fact belongs to the whole human race; and since writing also preserves slumbering thought so that the mind can awaken it, language forms an existence of its own, which can admittedly acquire validity only in each particular act of thinking, but which in its totality is independent of that act. The two opposed views introduced here—that language is foreign to the soul and belongs to it, is independent of it and dependent upon it—are actually united in language and constitute the distinctive character of its essence. Nor must this conflict be resolved by saying that language is partly foreign and independent, and partly neither. Language is an object and independent precisely insofar as it is a subject and dependent. For it has no permanent abode anywhere, not even in writing, but must always be produced anew in thinking, and must therefore pass wholly into the subject; yet the act of producing it entails making it just as much an object. Along this path it experiences the individual's full influence each time, but this influence is already inherently constrained by what language does and has done. The true resolution of this opposition lies in the unity of human nature mentioned above (34). In what springs from that which is in truth one with me, the concepts of subject and object, dependence and independence, pass into one another. Language belongs to me because I produce it. It does not belong to me because I cannot produce it otherwise than I do; and since the reason for this lies in the speaking, present and past, of all human generations, insofar as linguistic communication may have continued uninterrupted among them, it is language itself that imposes this restriction upon me.

**41** Yet the foreign influence to which human beings are subject in using language includes, besides the influence of language just mentioned, the influence that descent, surrounding circumstances and the manner of shared life exert upon the rest of their being, given language's close connection with that being as a whole. This is especially important in historical investigations of language: on the one hand, we must guard against explaining a language entirely through the circumstances acting upon the nation; on the other, we must not forget that even a language undeniably inherited in historical terms can undergo changes through the nation that seem incredible. Investigations of language everywhere deal with this twofold series of linked effects. For, like all investigations concerning humanity historically, they always place us only in the midst of things; attempting to conceive a beginning, let alone explain one, would lead to empty suppositions. Even where neither history nor tradition gives knowledge of an earlier state or reveals a more general connection, finding some such connection must therefore always remain a task for attention directed on every side.

**42** Consider how everything a people's language has undergone throughout all preceding centuries acts as a constraint upon the generation living at any given time, and how only the power of that single generation comes into contact with it—and not even that power in isolation, since the rising and departing generations live intermingled alongside one another. It then becomes clear how slight the individual's power really is beside the power of language. The balance is restored to some extent only through language's extraordinary malleability, through the possibility, which I shall discuss below, of taking up its forms in very different ways without impairing general understanding, and through the power that everything mentally alive exerts over the lifeless legacy handed down. Yet it is always in language that every individual feels himself to be nothing but an outflow of the whole human race. Nevertheless, because everyone individually and unceasingly acts back upon language, each generation produces a change in it, though in many cases this escapes observation. For the change can be twofold: a change in the words and forms themselves, and a change in their differently modified use; where writing and literature are absent, this latter change is in part smaller, in part harder to perceive.

**43** Since it is always only what already exists that is changed, and always only by an individual power struggling against an infinite mass, it follows of itself that every change in language, and also the emergence of new languages, takes place only gradually. Nations too, which go hand in hand with languages through the changing centuries, arise in no other way; and the means by which all new languages are formed, so far as we can discern them, are estrangement and admixture. A band branches off from a stock and settles where it either encounters no one as yet or mixes with another stock. There can be no question of the invention of a language within the domain of historical investigation of language; and expressions such as that a people creates its language, that language proceeds from its individuality, or even that it belongs exclusively to that people, require caution if they are to be used correctly. The same applies to the use of the concept of descent for languages[^nature-klaproth]: it must never be understood as meaning that one language could emerge in its totality from another, but only that the supposed mother language has changed into a daughter language in the mouths of generations that separated themselves and mixed with foreign ones. But since several languages pass into a new one in this way, applying this concept is already misleading in that it prompts a search for an ancestral language, whereas all the different materials of the language under investigation should be distinguished. Nations themselves are no more purely separated from one another: they too flow into one another and form gradually through the jointly operating principle of separation and cohesion; the distinctive character arising in this way, however, becomes visible at a certain point only after formation is complete.

**44** All the languages of peoples between whom any connection has ever existed must therefore be regarded as one language, transformed into manifold subtypes only through estrangement and mixture. This is a fundamental principle of every investigation of language, equally important for examining the similarity in kind of languages etymologically and for presenting philosophically the manner in which language spreads throughout humanity. It rests on the simple and undeniable fact that when people who have hitherto lived wholly apart visit or join one another, [they] gradually alter their original speech and transform it into a new speech on which they agree: usually both parties do so, though sometimes only one, overpowered by the other first physically and then mentally. Even when their original speech remains separate, individual words and forms nevertheless pass from one to the other. We must therefore seek out, etymologically, the different elements of a language and their relations. Only if all its elements were alike in kind and corresponded to the language of another people—that is, if the language had arisen solely through branching off, without any mixture—could the concept of descent fit. But since this concept always also entails earlier and later existence, the question of descent can almost never be decided from language alone. Philosophically, the task is now to investigate what human beings hold to most firmly in language, and what kinds of difference they enter into more readily or with greater difficulty.

**45** The unity of several languages expressed in the principle just established by no means signifies the unity of a primordial language; it means instead that each language contains some element that also belongs to another, and that, since this holds of all, all are indirectly changed and affected by one another. What distinguishes this assertion is its treatment of the different languages as coexisting parts—dialects—of a language encompassing them all, rather than as having arisen from one another over time. It makes, moreover, no pretension to novelty, but aims only, by cutting away untimely comparisons, to determine the concepts more firmly and bring them into closer agreement with the facts. The chronological succession of languages must not be neglected in their study either; it should merely not be introduced inappropriately. Since the beginnings of most languages still in existence are lost in darkness, our ignorance of their chronological succession makes them, in a sense, simultaneous for us.

**46** It seems to me useless and misleading to assume a primordial language, or to posit a difference between languages before and after the destruction of the greater part of humanity by a flood. Neither the domain of facts nor that of pure concepts can lead to this. There may have been one primordial language, or several: several in the strictest sense if humanity has more than one geographical point of origin; in a less strict sense if peoples had become so isolated—and great floods could indeed bring this about—that every trace of their former connection had disappeared from their language. But facts obtainable from languages will scarcely prove either possibility, and explaining phenomena in language will scarcely require either assumption. Nevertheless, provided one seeks to infer no particular conclusion from it, the concept of a primordial language can no more be rejected than that of any beginning of humanity. Thus, in relation to the principle established above (44), it may also happen that a band that has branched off from a people mixes with another band upon which none of the languages connected with the first has ever exerted an influence, even in the most indirect way. If one traced the succession of generations backwards, two such ethnic stocks would then indeed connect their languages with two primordial languages.

**47** Wherever actual contact between speakers has existed among peoples, however indirect, similarity in kind between their languages arises from language already formed; conversely, where such similarity arising from formed language can be recognized in languages, it proves that such contact occurred. This is important because it at least states the principle—even if that principle should prove of little practical use—by which the historical connection of languages can be distinguished from the similarity in kind that must be sought solely in the similarity in kind of human dispositions. For suppose that the American nations had originated in their own homeland and had not mixed with any inhabitants of the rest of the earth before the spread of the languages still in existence: no non-American sound would then have been heard in America, and no similarity in kind between the American languages and the other languages of the earth could have arisen through language already formed. Nevertheless, the general human dispositions would still be the same in America too; there would be the same unity of human essence—whether one derived it from descent from a single human pair or from the unity of the creative idea—without which (34) language itself would not be possible. A similarity in kind among languages would therefore necessarily have to arise from this too. In this sense there is only one language, just as there is only one human species and all differences of race annul neither the concept of humanity nor the possibility of regular reproduction. This becomes still more evident when we consider that the natural surroundings acting upon human beings, and consequently upon language too, are broadly the same, and that the means employed by all languages, namely sounds, are confined within limits that are not very wide. This general similarity in kind also occurs in historically connected languages, but only in those parts upon which sounds added from outside have exerted no influence, and even there never in a pure state: for in language, which exists only in the activity of producing it on each occasion (40), every influence always permeates the whole. Whether sufficient means exist to distinguish in languages themselves these two possible kinds of similarity may remain undecided for now; but it was necessary to determine their concepts precisely. We shall have to return to this point in great detail later, since America could more readily have remained free of all mixture with outsiders than any part of the Old World, unless one wished to except central Africa.

**48** We therefore encounter things alike in kind in all languages, and it would be vain to hope to find something wholly new in any one of them. I do not deny that the great similarity between the European and several Asian languages first drove me to study the American languages. I thought I would enter an entirely foreign domain there, and at first sight, and to a certain extent, that is indeed so; closer examination, however, shows the phenomena there too to be less alien. The task in investigating any language is thus to recognize what is characteristic within the similarity in kind. For language is always one: everything thought in language proceeds at each moment from the individual's whole language—or, if this seems clearer, from the individual's entire proficiency in language—and the whole language is therefore imprinted in this single utterance. What is alike in kind thus does not exist alongside what is characteristic, but passes into it: that is, the general power inherent in all humanity determines itself individually. Similarity in kind and individuality can therefore be separated only in the idea; and although the individual element, as the immediate fact, can only be perceived, not presented analytically to the understanding, we must nevertheless grasp both as far as possible in their unity. I would not wish what I have just said about the appearance of the whole language in each individual utterance to be taken for one of those exaggerations to which we so easily risk surrendering ourselves in general reasoning devoid of examples. What it is intended to express is that in language everything is determined by each part, and each part by everything; and this is literally true. A large part of this interconnectedness can even be demonstrated as a matter of fact in the simplest sentence, if one divides the sentence into its elements according to every kind of analysis possible in languages, places each element in all the categories that apply to it, compares it there with the other elements included in the same category, and then compares the categories themselves with one another, continuing in this way through all the determining relations of language and examining how the determination operative in each also determines the element of the given sentence. An infinite amount admittedly rests, however, on analogies in the feeling for language that cannot be presented explicitly.

**49** It follows of itself from the foregoing that, although the individual speech sound is the ultimate actual manifestation, the individuality of a language must not be sought solely in its sound, with similarity in kind assigned, perhaps, to the realm of ideas.[^nature-individuality] Rather, individuality shows itself in everything, and is one and the same throughout the totality of language, from the alphabet to the representation of the world (39). If those basic sounds were differently constituted, this way of viewing would be different too, and conversely. No one will demand that this actually be demonstrated in any particular language. That is admittedly impossible, but the matter remains true and important nonetheless: true because it follows necessarily from the nature of speaking and language developed above; important because, if we depart from the two fundamental truths of all investigation of language—that language forms a unity with the whole of human thinking and feeling, and that it exists nowhere except in the act of speaking and thinking in language, which perpetually produce one another—if, I say, we depart from these truths, we also overlook what can in fact be known in actual languages. Above all, a proper broadening of our perspective on languages is necessary to treat them correctly. Since everything in language is mental, the strength and fullness of its effect upon thinking and feeling depend on the energy and intelligence that employ it; and every more accurate insight into language comes alive in the whole human being through the purer influence of its individuality. In one's own use of language, however, everything that can never be presented by the analysing understanding also enters feeling, and thus knowledge; so use guided by a broader overview also gives rise to broader insight. What one has felt in one's own language, however deep and subtle it may be, one more readily intuits in a foreign one. Thus it is surely undeniable that, since the principal nations of Europe began writing in their mother tongues, an entirely different insight from that previously available has arisen into the connections within each of these languages and between each language and its nation. This too distinguishes that epoch, which I regard as the most important in the treatment of language, and which exerts a much more powerful influence in our time than the same phenomenon did among the ancients: among them only two languages came into contact, whereas among us several did, and in much livelier rivalry.

**50** But to leave nothing lacking in the precise delimitation of the concepts, we must add that the individuality of a language can itself be an individuality only in relative terms, and that true individuality lies only in the person speaking on each occasion. Indeed, only this completes the concept. A nation admittedly has, on the whole, the same language; yet not all its members have quite the same one (38), and if we proceed still further into the finest detail, every human being possesses a language of his own. No one thinks, in using a word, exactly what another does, and the difference, however small, trembles through the whole language, if we may compare language with the most mobile of all the elements. By virtue of the sameness of the individuality, the same difference recurs in every act of thinking and feeling, and forms a mass out of things individually imperceptible. All understanding is therefore always at the same time a not-understanding—a truth that can also be put to excellent use in practical life—and all agreement in thoughts and feelings is at the same time a divergence.[^nature-not-understanding] This remains invisible only where it hides beneath the generality of concept and feeling; but where heightened power breaks through that generality and individualizes more sharply even for consciousness, it comes clearly to light. Thus no one will deny that every significant writer has a language of his own. One may admittedly object that by language we mean only that generality of forms, words and rules which precisely allows room for diverse individualities; and this is certainly entirely true. Nevertheless, the view proposed here cannot on that account be banished even from the domain of the most general investigation of language. For there are several levels at which the generality of linguistic forms individualizes itself in this way, and the individualizing principle is the same: thinking and speaking within a particular individuality. This produces differences in the language of individuals just as it does in that of nations. Everywhere it is only a matter of more or less. We must therefore descend to the final level. One might indeed seek to find the boundary where language, though individually nuanced, still uses the same sounds. But this is already not entirely the case among the different classes of a nation; and the individual too uses some sounds by preference, employs others as though they were foreign to him, excludes still others altogether, and thereby forms his own dictionary, even apart from differences in meaning.

**51** Above all, however, it is necessary to draw attention to the modification of language in each individual in order to demonstrate human power over language, just as we have presented its power over human beings above (42, 43). Language's power over human beings can be regarded—if one is willing to apply the expression to mental powers—as a physiological operation; human power over language is purely dynamic. In the former lies the nature of language's operative powers, in the latter the principle of its freedom.[^nature-physiological] For something can arise within a human being whose ground no understanding can discover in the preceding states; and we would misconceive the nature of language, and violate precisely the historical truth of its emergence and transformation, if we sought to exclude from it the possibility of such inexplicable phenomena. But although freedom cannot be determined or explained, its limits can be recognized, though only within a certain latitude; and the investigation of language must recognize and honour the manifestation of freedom, while carefully tracing its limits, so as not to regard as possible through freedom in languages what is not possible.[^nature-latitude]

**52** Nations also continually change their languages purely through themselves, without branching off or mixture, in the continuation of their shared life; and after longer periods these changes become noticeable. The extent, speed and nature of these transformations depend on the liveliness of linguistic intercourse and on the depth with which human beings grasp the content of language. For we shall see below that there are different degrees of this. Attending to these transformations is a principal task of linguistic research. But even where language is reshaped more violently through branching off and mixture, national individuality exerts a predominant influence according to the way in which what is foreign touches it and the way it works upon that foreign material with its inherent power. It scarcely needs recalling, however, that to understand this national influence clearly we must return to the individual's distinctive treatment of language, which appears in that influence only as an aggregate.[^nature-aggregate] Yet even within a nation, an individual sometimes departs from the course established by everyone and brings a new way of treating language into currency, through an insight that suddenly lights up within him, through a decisive invention, or through his distinctive manner of using language. For although limits are set to the intellectual life of nations, just as to that of humanity, a certain latitude is nevertheless reserved for the individual here too. Wherever freedom moves within the bounds of finitude, there is admittedly a series of determining influences foreign to it at the moment of its operation; yet, like a flash of lightning from the cloudless aether, it can also suddenly step outside them and become self-determining.

**53** This is the ground of the unceasing creation alive in humanity and in the deeply stirred individual, and of the impossibility of ever calculating or exhaustively explaining the manner of their being, since the inexplicable principle of freedom remains mingled with every direction they take. In languages, this is why they unexpectedly take sudden flights upwards and do not even always sink gradually; why languages alike in kind in themselves receive such different treatment among different nations that they display great differences of character, as Greek and Latin do, for example; and why individual writers inaugurate entirely new epochs in the manner of their treatment. This last certainly also happens before the invention of writing, but there it is lost in obscurity for posterity.

**54** This consideration is especially important for linguistic research because it offers a warning against treating merely mechanical explanations as sufficient and against placing too much trust in analytical procedure. Research must indeed trace the uniform course human beings follow in transforming and forming language, but only while taking account of the independent power that can depart from that course or shorten it, and whose mere breath gives the materials of language an entirely different nature. We must indeed analyse and derive one thing from another, but only with a feeling that there are also true syntheses, in which idea and sound meet by a path that cannot be investigated further. Just as the stock of words and system of rules we call language are always fertilized by the living mind in thinking, speaking and recording, investigation too must always keep the living mind and dead language before it together, and follow their interaction. The individuality of nations can take such manifold paths that any attempt even to group it into classes would be futile. But for the principal influences upon language, only two points ever matter: whether national individuality inclines towards intellectual life at all, and from what direction; and whether it inclines specifically towards intellectual life through language. For just as in everyday life we encounter different degrees and kinds of need for language, feeling for language and treatment of language among human beings, so it is with nations; and what appears in the continual further development of languages also occurred when they arose from one another, since this emergence itself (43) could only have been a gradual becoming different. Much more could be said about this diversity in the national appropriation of language, were it not my purpose in this chapter to touch on particulars only by way of indication, so as to show the structure and interlocking of the whole.

**55** Now that we have considered language in general in its twofold nature—as a mental act in speaking and understanding, and as the dead material produced by that act, which never exists outside human beings but always exists outside the individual (40–54)—and have further distinguished its natural interconnectedness (40–51) from national and individual freedom (52–54), we shall turn to its procedure in detail. Two things now stand clearly apart within this procedure: words and the combining of words into discourse, as the matter and form of language. This division must not be confused with that into sounds and rules, for word formation too has rules, and the combining of words into discourse sometimes employs sounds peculiar to itself. Rather, regarding discourse as the purpose of language, we must hold firmly to the true nature of this classification: one part treats the elements of discourse, the other their combination. But since sound is common to both, consideration of the sound system must come first.

## Terminology guide

**General type** (*Typus*, *Sprachtypus*). The shared pattern of the mental process described in16–20, abstracting from circumstances that give particular languages their character. It is not a classification such as *inflecting* or *agglutinating*.

**Mind, soul and inner life** (*Geist*, *Seele*, *Gemüth*). This unit uses *mind*, *soul* and *inner life* to keep these recurring German terms recoverable. They overlap in reference; the wording does not impose a system of three separate faculties. The earlier English147 used *mind* for some instances of *Seele* and remains preserved.

**Representation and concept** (*Vorstellung*, *Begriff*, *Wesenheit*). A representation is what the mind presents to itself; a concept is its articulated determination in the argument. *Reality* translates *Wesenheit* where a thought acquires standing as an object for a subject, not necessarily material substance.

**Sound and articulation** (*Ton*, *Laut*, *Geräusch*, *Articulation*). Articulation is the shaping of sound into thought-bearing elements and combinations. *Ton* and *Laut* overlap and can both require *sound*; *speech sound* marks *Laut* where useful. *Geräusch* is *noise* in the specific contrast of21–22, without the implication of unwanted sound. *Alphabet* in29 and33 ranges over speech sounds rather than merely written letters.

**Power and capacity** (*Kraft*, *Vermögen*, *Sprachkraft*, *Sprachvermögen*, *Gewalt*, *Macht*). *Power of language* keeps the recurring *Sprachkraft* visible; *capacity for language* renders *Sprachvermögen*. These are contextual contrasts, not names for two independently established mechanisms. *Empfindung* is *feeling* in the thinking/feeling contrast and *sensation* where bodily or animal responsiveness is at issue. *Gewalt* and *Macht* can also require *power*; their German identity remains available in the source. In51 the crucial contrast is who acts upon whom, made explicit in the English, rather than three independently established kinds of mechanism. *Gefühl* also requires *feeling*; the German words overlap here rather than naming universally separate domains.

**Individuality and similarity in kind** (*Individualität*, *Gleichartigkeit*). Individuality is a distinctive way of being, said of languages, nations and persons at different levels; similarity in kind is what makes them comparable. The bearer and comparison matter. Sound’s privileged role in29 is qualified by49–50, as the local note explains.

**View and representation of the world** (*Weltansicht*, *Weltvorstellung*). *Weltansicht* in39 is *view of the world*: a standpoint and manner of apprehending things, not merely an explicit set of opinions. *Weltvorstellung* in49 is *representation of the world*; the English retains the change of German term. This does not by itself make every member of a nation hold identical beliefs;50 explicitly returns to individual differences.

**Descent, stock and contact** (*Abstammung*, *Stamm*, *Verkehr*, *Ursprache*). Descent may concern people or languages; the argument distinguishes these. *Stock* retains the historical grouping metaphor, including regional groups such as the Florentines in29, without making it a modern biological taxon. *Primordial language* belongs to the explicitly qualified origin discussion in45–47. In43 *mother language* is a supposed parent language; *mother tongues* in49 are people’s native languages.

**Speech, discourse, matter and form** (*Rede*, *Redeverbindung*, *Materie*, *Form*, *Stoff*). *Rede* concerns connected speech or discourse, rather than a stock of words. In55 the distinction is between words as matter and their combination into discourse as form, explicitly not simply sounds versus rules. *Material* renders *Stoff* where the inherited language is contrasted with its living production. *Dead* material means the inherited stock considered apart from its living use; it need not be an extinct language.

**Intellectual life** (*Intellectualitaet*). The repeated *Intellectualitaet* in52 and54 is *intellectual life*: the sphere towards which national activity is directed, with a role for language. It does not mean measured intelligence or modern national test scores. *Geistig* and *intellectuell* can also overlap as *mental* or *intellectual*; the English does not posit two exclusive faculties from that lexical difference.

**Nation and people** (*Nation*, *Volk*). These name the human communities in the argument, not automatically modern sovereign states. Humboldt places dialects, social groups and individual ways of speaking within them, and describes their historical formation through separation and cohesion.

**Thing and object** (*Gegenstand*, *Object*). In31 the word is contrasted with things and then becomes an object for a thinking subject;39 distinguishes an external object’s impression from the word’s own effect. *Object* can translate either German noun where the context supports it. *Gegenstand* does not invariably mean a physical thing:31 also calls *I* and *he* different *Gegenstände*.

## Notes

[^nature-indian-grammar]: Humboldt is describing the limits of his knowledge, not denying that India had a grammatical tradition. Pāṇini’s *Aṣṭādhyāyī* is a Sanskrit grammatical text; see its [opening rules](https://sanskritdocuments.org/doc_z_misc_major_works/aShTAdhyAyI.html?lang=iast). (Trans.)

[^nature-establishment]: The English takes intellectual activity as establishing the domain of sounds. The nearer German subject, articulated sound, is also possible; the hypothetical beginning may qualify that establishment or the whole account of producing articulated sound. (Trans.)

[^nature-noise]: *Noise* here means the audible physical component of speech, contrasted with articulation; it need not mean an unwanted or disorderly sound. See the terminology guide on sound and articulation. (Trans.)

[^nature-deaf-language]: *Deaf-mute* is Humboldt’s historical label. His account considers lip-reading, writing and taught speech; a natural sign language such as ASL is a complete visual language with its own grammar, not merely a set of signs for spoken sounds. See [NIDCD, American Sign Language](https://www.nidcd.nih.gov/health/american-sign-language), especially “What is ASL?” and “How does ASL compare with spoken language?” (Trans.)

[^nature-articulation-senses]: Passage21 separates articulation from audible noise; here Humboldt nevertheless restricts articulation in its essential nature to hearing. His restriction does not accommodate natural sign languages, whose grammar is expressed visually; see the preceding note on deaf people and language. (Trans.)

[^nature-starlight]: Air is needed to carry sound, but light can travel through a vacuum. The image here combines these different kinds of propagation; see [NASA, “Anatomy of an Electromagnetic Wave”](https://science.nasa.gov/ems/02_anatomy/), on mechanical and electromagnetic waves. (Trans.)

[^nature-animal-song]: Birds are not the only animals that sing: male humpback whales also produce complex songs. See [NOAA’s account of humpback whale song](https://hawaiihumpbackwhale.noaa.gov/science/research/whale-behavior.html), “Understanding the function of humpback whale song”. (Trans.)

[^nature-savages]: *So-called savages* preserves Humboldt’s qualified historical label. His immediate point is that these languages contain expressive resources beyond practical need, rather than being impoverished systems for obtaining help. (Trans.)

[^nature-abschliesst]: *Brings much to a close* follows the printed verb *abschliesst*, whose force here is uncertain: it may mean completing or closing off. ‘Wears much away’ would fit the contrast with what remains fixed, but would require a different German reading; the checked print has not been altered. (Trans.)

[^nature-inclusive-we]: The distinction is between ‘we, including you’ and ‘we, excluding you’: often called inclusive and exclusive *we*. Humboldt invokes different grammatical forms for these meanings, without giving a language-specific example here. (Trans.)

[^nature-origin-parenthesis]: The English reads the parenthesis as *not just … but also*, including both emergence as such and emergence in each act of speaking. The print has an uneven *not … but also* construction; the inclusive reading follows *also*, but a strictly literal rendering leaves the relation unclear. (Trans.)

[^nature-development]: The broad developmental pattern does not warrant the claim about all children under the most varied circumstances. Children differ in timing, and access to language matters; see [NIDCD, “Speech and Language Developmental Milestones”](https://www.nidcd.nih.gov/health/speech-and-language), the opening two sections. (Trans.)

[^nature-descent]: The proposed inherited destiny for a particular language is Humboldt’s inference, not something established by the examples offered here. He names no individual case in this passage; attachment to a familiar language does not by itself distinguish inheritance from experience. The German may instead mean that an original destiny was shifted onto another language; distinguish either reading from the descent of languages in43–47. (Trans.)

[^nature-inca]: Humboldt gives no name or example that identifies this variety precisely. *The language of the Incas* here should therefore not be silently equated with a particular modern language; the point of the example is its joint association with family descent and social rank. (Trans.)

[^nature-klaproth]: Mr Klaproth already makes this observation in *Asia polyglotta*, p. [43.] (Humboldt)

[^nature-individuality]: This qualifies the earlier emphasis on sound in29: here individuality extends throughout a language, and50 places *true individuality* in the individual speaker. The changes in level—from a language’s audible identity to its entire character and then its speakers—should remain visible rather than being harmonized into one unchanging claim. (Trans.)

[^nature-not-understanding]: The claim concerns differences within understanding, not its complete impossibility: even speakers who agree do not attach precisely identical content to a word. The qualification develops the differences introduced in50 rather than retracting the possibility of communication argued for earlier. (Trans.)

[^nature-physiological]: *Physiological* describes language’s inherited power over its users; *dynamic* describes their power to act upon it. Humboldt expressly marks the physiological term as an analogy applied to mental powers, not a claim about a measured bodily mechanism. (Trans.)

[^nature-latitude]: The English takes *within a certain latitude* to qualify how far freedom’s limits can be recognized. It may instead describe the latitude within which freedom itself operates;52 uses the same word for the scope left to an individual. (Trans.)

[^nature-aggregate]: *In that influence* takes the compressed German pronoun to refer to national influence: individual treatments appear there in the aggregate. ‘In the individual’ is grammatically possible, but fits the contrast between collective influence and individual activity less well. (Trans.)
